Data controller / processor: OMNIA Inclusion Ltd (registered in England & Wales, company no. 17228173). Registered office: 169 High Street, Marske-by-the-Sea, Redcar & Cleveland, TS11 7LN, United Kingdom.
Version: 1.7 Last reviewed: 2026-11-11 Owner: Data Protection Officer (school-side) + OMNIA Inclusion Ltd platform team
1. Purpose of processing
OMNIA helps schools document Special Educational Needs and Disability (SEND) provision: inclusion plans, behaviour plans, EAA arrangements, Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans, parent voice, referrals, JCQ access arrangements (including Form 8 and parental consent), annual / statutory review records, and supporting evidence.
Lawful bases relied on:
- GDPR / UK GDPR Art. 6(1)(e) + Art. 9(2)(g) — public interest task (statutory SEND duties, JCQ regulations for exam access arrangements).
- UAE PDPL Art. 5(d) + Art. 6 — necessity for performance of a contract with the parent and compliance with KHDA / ADEK regulatory obligations.
2. Data categories processed
| Category | Examples | Sensitivity |
|---|---|---|
| Pupil identity | Name, DOB, photo, year group, national ID | Personal |
| SEND data | Primary need, plans, targets, specialist reports | Special category |
| Parent voice | Free-text responses about the child | Personal + special category |
| Staff identity | Staff name, email, role | Personal |
| Audit metadata | IPs, user agents, timestamps | Personal |
| Staff timetable assignments | Staff↔pupil↔provision links, period times, location | Personal (staff) + linked to special-category pupil data |
| Access-arrangement evidence | JCQ Form 8, normal way of working, assessor reports, parental consent | Special category |
| Review records | Annual / statutory review attendees, decisions, sign-off | Personal + special category |
| Available Interventions Register | School's deliverable intervention programmes; staff names as trained-to-deliver | Personal (staff) |
| Assessment platform import data | Scores and progress data from Lexia Core5, Nessy, Sparx Maths, DoodleLearning, TTRS, Emile, GL Assessment, PUMA, MAP, and others | Personal + linked to special-category SEND data |
| AI plan generation rationale | Per-target contextual rationale in plan_targets.rationale; references assessment scores, voice entries, strategy history | Special category (linked to SEND data) |
| Allergies and medical needs | Allergens, adrenaline (device, location, expiry), Allergy and Asthma Action Plan dates and issuers, healthcare plan status and review date, emergency instructions, spare-pen consent, other conditions | Special category |
| MIS medical and dietary records | Condition description, severity and treatment as held in the school's MIS, copied via Wonde when the school turns medical data on | Special category |
| MIS behaviour and achievements | Type, date and time, outcome, location, comment, pupil's role and recording staff member, as held in the school's MIS, copied via Wonde when the school turns behaviour on; visible to admins, SENCos and inclusion leads only. Can suggest behaviour support plan assessment answers (frequency, first concern, settings, times of day), which staff confirm or change; only confirmed answers reach AI. Records, comments and staff names are not sent to AI | Personal + linked to special-category SEND data |
| Go4Schools behaviour events | Type, classification, date and time, subject, action taken and comment, as held in the school's Go4Schools, pulled with the school's own Go4Schools key; shown with MIS behaviour on the profile (an incident in both counted once) and used for behaviour support plan suggestions that staff confirm; not sent to AI | Personal + linked to special-category SEND data |
| Combined pupil timeline ("The big picture") | Weekly attendance (MIS marks from the start of the school year), behaviour and achievements, results, and dated markers for support, plans, suspensions, reduced timetables, managed moves, medical incidents and pupil voice; derived from the categories above, no new collection; leads only; no scores or predictions; factual observations only. Counted lines a lead ticks may inform an AI-assisted plan or behaviour support plan draft; the server keeps only lines matching its own count; no names, comments or raw records are sent | Special category (combined) |
| Medical incidents and near misses | Who was affected (pupil, staff member or visitor), what happened, response, adrenaline given, 999 called, outcome, parents told, lessons learned | Special category (pupils, staff and visitors) |
| Allergy safety records | Staff allergy-awareness training dates; spare adrenaline pens and inhalers (location, quantity, expiry); allergy policy lead, review date and link | Personal (staff) |
3. Data flows
Parent ─┐ ┌─► Inclusion team (browser, RLS-scoped)
├─► OMNIA web app ─┤
Staff ──┘ ├─► Lovable Cloud (Postgres, encrypted at rest)
├─► Microsoft Graph (optional: SharePoint discovery,
│ shared mailbox for parent links)
├─► Lovable AI Gateway (specialist-summary OCR/LLM,
│ Specialist Support Prompts) — standard mode
└─► School's own AI provider (BYOK opt-in) —
Anthropic or Azure OpenAI, in the school's
chosen region (e.g. UAE North, UK South)
The Staff Timetabling tool reads and writes the same Lovable Cloud (Postgres)
tables as the Resource Optimiser (staff_allocations, plus its own
timetable_periods and staff_timetable_slots). It introduces no new
processors and no new data egress.
Specialist Support Prompts read already-documented provision data and
surface professionally-framed prompts to qualified staff. They are never
visible to parents or pupils, never make clinical claims, and every prompt
acceptance / rejection is written to audit_logs.
4. Processors
| Processor | Role | Region | DPA |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lovable / Supabase | Hosting, database, storage | EU (AWS eu-west-1, Ireland) | Yes |
| Microsoft Graph | Optional SharePoint + email for parent links | School's tenant | School's existing M365 DPA |
| Lovable AI Gateway | Support assistant only (search over OMNIA's help pages; no pupil records), and the emergency standby route for AI. Text passes OMNIA's PII scrubber first. | Not stated by Lovable; transfers under EU SCCs + UK Addendum | Lovable DPA (no training on customer personal data, s.10.1) |
| Google Cloud Vertex AI (standard mode) | Main AI provider: plan and target drafting, summaries, report Q&A answers, translation, document search indexing | London (europe-west2); text scrubbed first | OMNIA's own Google Cloud agreement; no training on customer data |
| Google Cloud Vertex AI (voice transcription fallback) | Transcribes a recording only when the staff member's device can't and the school allows the fallback (or via the school's own Gemini key) | London (europe-west2); audio, not scrubbable | OMNIA's own Google Cloud agreement; school can switch the fallback off |
| OpenAI (embeddings, via Lovable) | Support assistant search over OMNIA's help pages only | Outside UK/EEA; no pupil records | Via Lovable; not opted in to training |
| School's own AI provider (BYOK opt-in) | Replaces OMNIA's London service for that school's traffic; Anthropic, Azure OpenAI, OpenAI or Google Gemini under the school's own contract (document search indexing uses OMNIA-managed AI where that provider can't do it) | School-elected region (UAE North, UK South, etc.); may be outside the UK/EEA; the school is responsible for residency assessment | School's direct DPA with the provider |
5. Risks & mitigations
| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cross-tenant data leak | Low | High | Row-Level Security on every domain table; explicit .eq("school_id", schoolId) filter on every server-fn read/write as defence-in-depth; nightly schema linter. Tenant guard on supabaseAdmin writes (e.g. mergeIntoPlan); staff admin server fns tenant-scope via getAdminScope() + assertTargetInScope(). Only superadmins can change profiles.school_id, and never their own (trigger-enforced). A September 2026 security audit closed 14 cross-tenant vulnerabilities, a Postgres column-grant gap, and a systemic server-function auth-failure issue affecting 717 functions that were throwing raw Response objects instead of enforcing tenant checks. |
| Parent voice link interception | Medium | Medium | 4-digit PIN gate, PBKDF2-SHA256 hashed PINs (210,000 iterations), rate-limit (per-IP + per-token via enforceRateLimit) + 15 min lockout after 5 attempts, single-use tokens, 30-day expiry |
| Inappropriate staff access | Low | Medium | Role-based access (superadmin / admin / inclusion_lead / SENCo / teacher / peep_only / read_only); Teaching Assistant view sees least; External Professional view scoped to plan summaries only; per-pupil audit trail visible to SENCo; MFA (TOTP, AAL2) mandatory and server-enforced for superadmins and for admins of live schools |
| LLM data exposure (standard mode) | Low | Medium | Single chokepoint (callLovableAiChat); server-side PII scrubber (scrubPii/scrubMessages: pupil names including each part of the name, staff names where known, emails, phone, UPN/ULN, NI, address, postcode, dates) runs on outbound text by default, including BYOK and document search indexing; bypassed only for audio transcription (which runs on the staff member's device; the optional server fallback is in London) and for public or aggregate content with no pupil data; not opted in to provider training; upstream retention governed by AI Gateway and its providers; scrubber is best-effort defence-in-depth, not a guarantee: free-text fields (e.g. narrative report text, voice transcripts) can still carry residual identifiers to the model |
| LLM data exposure (BYOK mode) | Low | Medium | School elects provider (Anthropic / Azure OpenAI / OpenAI / Google Gemini) and region under its own DPA. API key AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest (BYOK_ENC_KEY); plaintext never returned to client (only provider, endpoint, last4, active, verified_at exposed). PII scrubbing still applied. No silent fallback to OMNIA's shared key; failures surface to the school admin. Region may sit outside UK/EEA (e.g. UAE North); residency is the school's controller decision. |
| SharePoint over-discovery | Medium | Medium | Drive allow-list, GDPR acknowledgement gate, manual confirm before file binds to pupil |
| Stale data retention | Medium | Low | Daily retention sweep (see /docs/data-retention.md) |
| Inappropriate visibility of staff schedules | Low | Low | Premium feature flag (off by default); RLS-scoped per school; teachers see only their own + their year groups; SENCo/admin see all within school |
| Access-arrangement evidence mis-handling | Low | High | JCQ Form 8 authored via Zod-validated structured form; parental consent captured per arrangement with timestamp and route; audit-timeline export logged in audit_logs; retention aligned to on-roll + 7 years |
| Audit-log tampering | Low | High | RLS denies UPDATE/DELETE on audit_logs and system_audit_logs for authenticated/anon via USING (false); only supabaseAdmin (server-side service-role) can mutate |
| Specialist Support Prompts misuse | Low | Medium | Reads only documented provision data; presented as professional prompts (not clinical claims); never visible to parents/pupils; accept/reject logged in audit_logs |
| Assessment import PII exposure (Lexia) | Low | High | Lexia Core5 CSV exports contain DOB, gender, and race. Server-side PII stripping function removes these fields immediately on import before any database write. Fields are never stored. Stripping enforced in Edge Function, not client-side. |
| Available Interventions Register access | Low | Low | Staff names in trained_staff field are staff personal data. Read restricted to school members by RLS; write restricted to admin and SENCo roles. Programme names and delivery formats only included in AI context — staff names never transmitted to AI. |
| Contextual AI rationale retention | Low | Medium | plan_targets.rationale references specific assessment scores and voice content. Mitigated by: SENDCo and above role access only; never shown to parents, pupils, or teachers; parent-facing plan view excludes rationale entirely. |
| Edge runtime exposure | Low | Medium | Server-side logic runs on Cloudflare Workers; no pupil data persisted at the edge; secrets injected per request, never logged |
| Medical information seen by staff who don't need it | Low | High | Three levels of access. Staff who teach a pupil (from the school's class lists) see the medical flag, the pupil's allergens, where their adrenaline is kept, the emergency instructions and who to check with; the DfE's Allergy safety in schools guidance (July 2026) expects staff to know these. Condition names, plan details, MIS records and notes are seen only by the medical lead, SENCo and admin (has_medical_admin). Staff who don't teach the pupil see nothing; where a school has no class lists in OMNIA, all staff see the flag but not condition names. RLS on pupil_allergy_records, school_emergency_medicines, staff_allergy_training and medical_incidents allows reads by medical leads only (plus the reporter for their own incident); all writes go through server functions with role checks. |
| Medical data sent to AI | Low | High | Medical and allergy information is not included in AI prompts (plan drafting, behaviour support plans, summaries). |
| MIS medical records acted on without checking | Medium | Medium | MIS records do not populate the flag directly: the pupil shows as "From the MIS: not checked" until the medical lead reviews and confirms them. Dietary needs never raise a medical flag. |
| Printed allergy list seen by pupils or visitors | Medium | Medium | Only the medical lead, SENCo or admin can open or print it; the sheet is headed "Staff only: do not display where pupils or visitors can see"; the guidance recommends it for staff areas where food is handled. |
| Incident reports | Low | Medium | Any member of staff can record one; they see only their own; the medical lead, SENCo and admin see all and record the follow-up. Safeguarding concerns are directed to the DSL, not recorded here. |
6. Data subject rights
- Access (PDPL Art. 13 / GDPR Art. 15): DSAR pack generated from the pupil page. Restricted to admin, SENCo and inclusion-lead roles. Includes all rows + redacted security tokens + audit log.
- Erasure (PDPL Art. 14 / GDPR Art. 17): "Erase pupil record" admin action with two-step confirmation. Cascade-deletes across plans, PEEPs, referrals, parent voice, share links, discovered files, staff allocations, timetable slots, access-arrangement records, consent rows and Form 8 JSON; storage folder cleared. Audit row written before deletion.
- Rectification: SENCos can edit any pupil record directly.
- Restriction / objection: raise with school DPO; OMNIA exposes per-pupil "mark as left" plus per-record edit/delete.
Erasure cascade also includes: available_interventions rows linked to the school on school deletion; student_assessments rows linked to the pupil; plan_targets.rationale for all plans linked to the pupil.
7. Children's data
OMNIA processes data about children only on the school's lawful basis as
above. Parents are informed via the privacy notice surfaced on every
parent-voice form before submission, and consent to that submission is
captured as consent_given_at on each request.
8. Review cadence
This DPIA is reviewed:
- annually by the school DPO,
- on any change to processors,
- on any change to the data categories above,
- after any security incident,
- on enabling the Staff Timetabling premium feature for a school.
- On enabling or populating the Available Interventions Register for a school for the first time.
- On adding a new assessment platform integration that introduces new data categories or demographic fields requiring PII stripping.
Version history (from 1.6)
| Version | Date | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 1.6 | 29 October 2026 | Corrected the AI provider description: Google Gemini is the main AI provider and OpenAI is used for document search indexing only; Anthropic only via a school's own key. Clarified scrubbing coverage (voice audio can't be scrubbed). PINs now PBKDF2-SHA256; MFA server-enforced for superadmins and admins of live schools. |
| 1.7 | 11 November 2026 | Added allergies and medical needs, MIS medical records, medical incidents and school allergy safety records (section 2), and their risks and mitigations (section 5): need-to-know access, no AI, MIS records checked before use, staff-only allergy list, incident access. |
| 1.8 | 12 November 2026 | Added MIS behaviour and achievements (section 2): opt-in, leads only, read-only copy of the MIS; recorded incidents can suggest behaviour support plan answers that staff confirm before AI drafting, and records, comments and staff names are never sent to AI. Added Go4Schools behaviour events (section 2), used the same way, and the combined pupil timeline for leads (section 2), including lead-confirmed counted lines in AI-assisted drafts. |
